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4.

Socrates

Later Greek philosophers started with questions somewhat
different from those of their predecessors. Instead of asking
about the nature of the universe, they first concerned themselves
with the nature of man, how he can know, and what he should do.
These questions ultimately led them back to the earlier ones,
but now with a different perspective. This change in emphasis
came as the life ~f the independent £ity-state was drawing to its
unhappy close and as it seemed that men were being cast adrift
on uncharted seas. ~hree great figures dominate this period of
~
Greek philosophy by virtue of their attempts to find new moorings
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for the human life : Socrates, Plato , and Aristotle. By common
consent these names are foremost in the history of philosophy~
It was Cicero who wrote that Socrates "brought down philosophy from heaven to eart!;:l." Our information about Socrates
(469-399 B. C . ), who left no body of writings, comes primarily
through the works of his disciple, Plato .
It is therefore impossible to know just exactly how much of Plato there is in
Socrates and how much of Socrates in Plato. An Athenian citizen, he was an independent stonecutter who began life with a
small legacy from his father . He was a citizen-soldier who
participated in several campaigns, which took him out of Athens
for what may have peen the only occasions in his life.
He was
the good citizen who participated in the deliberations of the
Assembly and took his turns holding public office.

(

Socrates grew to manhood in an Athens which was approaching trouble :
the Peloponnesian War and the decline of its
democracy . He was himself critical of a government whose sense
of values was so inconsistent that it hired an expert to build
a road while at the same time it equated the judgment of all
citizens in matters involving public and private morals. He
was aware of the speculations about the universe that were current in his day, but he gave up interest in them for something
else . His mother had been a midwife . He resolved to follow
her voc~on and function as a midwife helping to deliver know-V
ledge . lfie was convinced that the best possible help for the
polis wtl?ch he respected lay in the world of idea~
There was in later fifth century Athens a group of men
known as the Sophists (the wise men) . They had come from many
.L
places, attracted by the unchallenged cultural center of the ~.he ~ tJ;)
day. These men had given up any hope of learning ultimate
/ft~
~
truth about_: the universe or man.
To them all knowledge was ~0
relative . ihat seems to me is so to me, they would say, and ~ -- -p ·
what seems to you is so to you; man is the measure of all
things -- things are as they appear to him to bm
The Sophists sharply criticized beliefs and traditions long accepted
without question but which they argued were not proved. Why
talk about virtue, they said, when no one can prove what virtue
is? Why talk of justice ~ when in fact it is nothing more than
the interest of the stronger?.
Most of what we know about the Sophists comes from the
hands of their enemies. By profession they were teachers and
for a time they were the most influential educators in Athens.
It is reasonable to assume that there were sincere Sophists as
well as those who gave the word "sophistry" its usual meaning
today ~ ~ liberately fallacious reasoning which is sound only
in appearanc . · Some of them did set out to prepare young men to
make a succ ess of their iives by clever use of a powerful tool,
the human reason . Also , they expected to be paid for their
services . This was perhaps another onimous sign in a society
which regarded education as a function of the polis.
In any
event, it helped make them unpopular.
The Sophists were opposed

~
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most vehemently by those Athenians who wiShed to return to the
beliefs and practices of an earlier day.
Socrates refused to accept either of these points of view
without a thoroughgoing analysis of what they implied. This
analysis took the form of asking questions of both sides, any
place and any time, and of moving from one answer to another
question in order to find out exactly what was meant when they
said that man is the measure of all things or that piety is
doing what the gods want.
So skillful was Socrates in using
what has come to be called the Socratic method and so devastating was his analysis that he made both sides appear groundless. Many onlookers thought that they were watching a good
show and that perhaps Socrates was the critic whose main motivation in analyzing was to destroy. \Indeed, his self-styled
role as the gadfly which stings peopte into action resembled
that of the Sophists . But however negative it may have appeared, his intent was constructive . He proposed nothing less
than a rational search for the meaning of life, one that woul
reject the sanctions of authority and of practicality. To him
an unexamined life was not worth living:
the proper study of
mankind is rna
Socrates was at one with the Sophists in believing that
the popular mind was thoroughly confused about morality. He
departed from them in believin)that morality could be brought
to rest on solid foundations.
ve~ man, he said, does what he
believes at the time to be goo
e was thoroughly convinced -this was one of his most ·tenacious eliefs -- that no man doe~
~
evil knowingly. By evil he meant fundamentally an error of
j u d gment which was the result of ignorance. Each person must
decide what is good before he acts . Since he is responsible to ~
what Socrates called the Good to do the best that he can, he
must also learn to know the best there i~
To many a Sophists, goodness could lie in a technique, such
as convincing public speaking, by which a lawyer might achieve
fame and fortune.
But this technique could be used to acquit
a guilty man or to condemn an innocnet one.
For Socrates,
knowledge of what is good will neve~ be put to a wrong use,
since no man does evil kn?wingly .··· ~ the same to~en, virtue
is knowledge, and this Socrates proclaimed. The emphasis on
the freedom of the individual to search combined with his accountability to something higher than had hitherto been envisaged in
Athens -- the Good -- marks the point at which ethics became a
separate discipline within philosoph~
Socrates believed that no man could offer a definition of
the Good, since that would arrogate more knowledge than he was
willing to admit that man possesses.
It would also deny to
others their own responsibility and would probably break off
the discussion by which men could help each other in their
search for the Good. Even if he could not define it, though,
he insisted on believing in the reality of the Good. There was

~

I

p. 17

nothing of what we would call faith in the supernatural here,
because Socrates refused to accept any other support than his
unaided reason.
He was satisfied that unless we accept the existence of the Good we are left in the grip of a skepticism in
which one man's opinion is as good as another's and in which
might makes right.
e believed that human life found its high~
est expression and meaning in the love (eros) which reaches out
and searches for the Good, rising from things, acts, and persons until it approaches comprehension of the ideal form of the
Good, itself both good and beautif~
Nor was the search for the Good a blind one, for man could
know when he was near it through a memory by means of which he
could recognize it. · Socrates believed that before birth everyone has looked upon the Good as it really is, apart from the
physical world.
The story from Greek mythology had man drinking
from the river Lethe and forgetting everything he had seen.
~ Ckater, when the memory reawakens, man comes to know by recog• nizing what he once knew and then forgot . Socrates said that he
had an additional aid in this search. He called · it his inner
voice, or daemon . Whenever this voice spoke to him it ·was in
negative terms only . It never told him what to do.
As long as
the voice w~ ~ilent, Socrates ·felt assured that he was on the
right track-.1

One of the oft-expressed Greek ideals was harmony. Upon
close inspection, we find that Greek everyday .life in its many
aspects was rarely harmonious . Particularly during the later
life of Socrates, the demands of the polis and the demands of
his individuality often created a tens1on within a thinking man.
After its defeat at the hands of Sparta, Athens was forced to
replace the democracy which Socrates had often criticized with
an oligarchy which itself was soon overthrown . In the midst of
this political turmoil, few people could appreciate the necessity of examining one's life.
Some thought ·that the influence
of Socrates was at best subversive, .especially after several pf
his folloWers were accused
the democrats of treason and ~ ./ft""'u<
cowardice. lQh arged wi th@~e trfand corrupting the youth of j -!-l,t. ~
Athens who were his pupi s, e was brought to trial. The sentence imposed was death by drinking hemlock . Although Socrates
had implied ·that there was a higher reference for a man than the
polis, and although in all probability he could have escaped
v
from prison and gone into exile, he chose to accept the verdict
with which he disagreed but whose legality he refused to call
into question . P~ato
. .r ented his version of the defense made
by Socrates in th
polog
an excerpt from which follows.
It H. ~
should be obvious t a
e word "apology" is used here in a dif ~£41: 1
ferent sense from the way we are accustomed to using it.
;~~~~1
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.. . Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a
certain sort of wisdom which I possess . If you ask me
what kind of wisdom, I reply, such wisdom as is attainable by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe
that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking
have a superhuman wisdom, which I may fail to describe,

./
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because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have,
speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here,
0 men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even
if I seem to say something extravagant.
For the word
which I will speak is not mine.
I will refer you to a
witness who is worthy of credit, and will tell you about
my wisdom -- whether I have any, and of what sort -- and
that witness shall be the God of Delphi. You must have
known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also
a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the
people, and returned with you . Well, Chaerephon, as you
know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went
to Delphi anq boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether
-- ~s I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt -- ~e
asked the oracle to tell him whether there was any one
wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered,
~
that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself;
but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth
of this story~
Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain
to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the
answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what
is the interpretation of this riddle? for I know that I
have no wisdom, small or great. What can he mean when he
says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god and
cannot lie; that would be against his nature.
After a
long consideration, I at last thought of a method of trying the question.
I reflected that if I could only find
a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with
a refutation in my hand.
I should say to him, "Here is
a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the
wisest." Accordingly I w.e nt to one who had the reputation
of wisdom, and observed h i m -- his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom \-Selected for examination -and the result was as follows : ~en I began to talk with
him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise,
although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by
himself; and I went and tried to explain to him that he
thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the
consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was
shared by several wqo were present and heard me·. So I
left him, saying to myself, as I went away : Well, although
I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really
beautiful and good, I am better off than he is, -- for he
knows nothing, and thinks that he knows .
I neither know
~
nor thjQk that I know.
In this latter particular, then ~ I
seem to have slightly the advantage of him . Then I sent to
another who bad s~ill higher philosophical pretensions, and
my conclusion was exactly the same .
I made another enemy
of him, and of many others beside him:(. . .
This investigation has led to my having many enemies of
the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion
also to many calumnies . And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I
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find wanting in others : but the truth is, 0 men of Athens,
that God only is wise; and in this oracle he means to say
that the wisdom of men is little or nothing; he is not
speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name as an illustration, as if he said, He, 0 men, is the wisest, who, like
Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing.
And so I go my way, obedient to the god, and make inquisition into the wisdom of any one, whether citizen or stranger,
who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and
this occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to
give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my
devotion to the god .. . ... . .
And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own
sake, as you rna th' k, but for yours, that you may not
~in again_? ~ ~ God .- <;>r lightly r7ject his b<;>on b~ condemn1ng me.
For 1 you k1ll me you w1ll not eas1ly f1nd another
like me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech,
am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by the God; and the
state is like a great and noble steed who is tardy in his
motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred
into life.
I am that gadfly which God has given the state,
and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon
you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you.
And as
you will not easily find another like me, I would advise you
to spare me .
I dare say that you may feel irritated at
being suddenly awakened when you are caught napping; and
you may think that if you were to strike me dead as Anytus
advises, which you easily might, then you would sleep on
for the remainder of your lives unless God in his care of
you gives you another gadfly . ~nd that I am given to you by
God is proved by this :
that if I had been like other men,
I should not have neglecte4 all my own concerns, or patiently
seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have
been doing yours, coming to you individually, like a father ~
or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue; this, I
say, would not be like human nature . And had I gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have
been some sense in that : but now, as you will perceive,
not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I
have ever exacted or sought pay of any one; they have no
witness of that . And I have a witness of the truth of what
I say; my poverty is a sufficient witnes ~
Some one may wonder why I go about in private, g1v1ng
advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but
do not venture to come forward in public and advise the
state.
I will tell you the reason of this. You have often
heard me speak of an oracle or sign which comes to me, and
is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the indictment.
This sign I have had ever since I was a child . The sign is
a voice which comes to me and always forbids me to do something which I am going to do, but never commands me to do
anything, and this is what stands in the way of my being a
politician.
And rightly, as I think.
For I am certain, 0
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men of Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I should
have perished long ago, and done no good either to you or
to myself
And don't be offended at my telling you the
truth: ~r the truth is, that no man who goes to war with
you or any other multitude,, honestly struggling against the
commission of unrighteousness and wrong in the state, w i l l /
save his life; .he who will really fight for the right, if
he would live even for a little while, must have a private
station and not a public one ~ . :!
Now do yo~ really imagine that I could have survived
all these years, if I had led a public life, supposing that
like a,good man I had always supported the right and had
made justice, as I ought, the first thing?
No indeed, men
of Athens, neither I nor any other.
But I have been always
the same . in all my actions, public as well as private, and
never have I yielded any base compliance to these who are
sland~rou~ly t~rmed my disciples, or to any other.
For the
truth is that I have no regul~r disciples:
but if any one
likes to come and hear me while I am pu~suing my mission,
whether he be young or old, he may freely come.
Nor do I
converse with those who pay only, and not with those who do
not pay; but any one, whether he be rich or poor, may ask
and answer me a·nd listen to my words; and whether he turns
out to be a bad man or a good one, that cannot be justly
laid to my charge, · as I never taught him anything.
And if
any one says t~at he pas ever learned or heard anything
from me in private which all the world has not heard, I
should like you to know that he is speaking an untruth.
~ut I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually cohversing with you? I have told you already, Athe~
nians, the whole truth about this:
they like to hear the
cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom; there is 7
amusement in this.
And this is a duty which he Go~ has · ~
imposed upon me, as I am assured by oracles, ·-isions, and
in every sort of way in which the will of divine power was
ever signified to any one. This is true, 0 Athenians; or,
if not true, would be soon refuted.
For if I am really
corrupting the youth, and have corrupted some of them already, those of them who have grown up and have become
sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their
youth should come forward as accusers and take their revenge; and if they do not like to come themselves, some
of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsme~~
should say what evil their families suffered at my hand~
Now is their time ....

*

* The Dialogues of Plato
Charles Scribner-and Company,

, trans. B. Jowett (New York:
1872), I, 318-331.

